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 1 Introduction 
 A realist portrayal of science should accommodate the fact that science 
describes the world from numerous “perspectives.” The nature of these 
perspectives and their interrelationships have for long been the bread 
and butter of history and philosophy of science. Realists continue grap-
pling with challenges arising from the contingencies of grand theoretical 
perspectives (or “paradigms”) and the ever-increasing plurality of models 
used for predicting and explaining various phenomena. These challenges 
turn on the inconsistencies that science seems to harbor, threatening the 
realist credo that science successfully works by virtue of “getting things 
right about the world.” A natural realist hope is that these inconsistencies 
can be accommodated through an apt notion of “perspective,” which is 
compatible with the basic realist credo. 
 What notion of “scientific perspective” should realism incorporate 
then? Answering this question helps with understanding scientific real-
ism, and it is further instigated by recently developed perspectivist foils 
to more traditional realism by Ronald Giere, Paul Teller, and Michela 
Massimi. 1 These self-proclaimed “perspectival realists” have developed 
and defended views about the  perspectival nature of scientific knowledge 
that put emphasis on it “being situated” in historical and modeling con-
texts ( Massimi 2018b , 164). Thus perspectivists characterize scientific 
knowledge as “the inevitable product of the historical period to which 
those scientific representations, modeling practices, data gathering, and 
scientific theories belong,” and as being embedded in “a prevailing cul-
tural tradition in which those scientific representations, modeling prac-
tices, data gathering, and scientific theories were formulated” ( Massimi 
2018b , 164). 
 I am doubtful that the realist’s optimism and commitment toward sci-
entific progress and theorizing (especially in the fundamental sciences) are 
best captured in terms of scientific knowledge. Articulating an alternative 
vision for realism is a book-length project. The limited aim of this chapter 
is to present a different, realist-friendly notion of scientific perspective 
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that does not concern knowledge. In particular, I wish to focus on what 
I call “explanatory perspectives” in relation to a (minimally) realist com-
mitment to accumulating scientific  understanding . Shifting the focus 
from knowledge to understanding yields a different kind of perspectiv-
ism, since understanding (as presently explicated) is not knowledge but 
rather an ability. The factivity of knowledge (namely that knowledge 
entails truth) is an almost universally accepted platitude about knowl-
edge. By contrast, I will argue that explanatory perspectives in science 
and their indispensability spring specifically from the  non-factive aspects 
of theoretical representations that maximize our scientific understanding. 
 In particular, I will argue that insofar as scientists’ understanding can 
be enhanced by idealizations and/or false metaphysical presuppositions—
whether mistakenly believed or merely entertained as useful fiction—such 
non-factive aspects of theorizing naturally give rise to mutually incompat-
ible perspectives on natural phenomena. Briefly put, explanatory perspec-
tives are ways of thinking about and representing a subject matter (say, 
light) in an explanatory context, which function to augment our under-
standing of the natural phenomena we are theorizing about (say, the rain-
bow). We will see, furthermore, that understanding-enhancing non-factive 
aspects can be involved in theories that best support genuine explanatory 
understanding in a given historical or modeling context, without scientists 
necessarily knowing all the respects in which these theories are idealized 
or false. All in all, I will conclude that increasing scientific understanding 
does not just amount to accumulating knowledge, since understanding is 
not factive in the way knowledge is, and non-factive aspects of theoretical 
representations can increase our understanding without us knowing their 
non-factive status. Rather, what matters for explanatory progress is that 
understanding-providing theories and models de facto latch on to reality 
in appropriate ways so as to satisfy explanations’ basic factivity require-
ment (to be explicated below). 2 
 The present focus on explanatory understanding is limited, of course, 
but not unprincipled. Taking a stance on scientific explanations, and the 
kind of understanding they provide of natural phenomena, is critical for 
demarcating realist commitments, since realists typically take scientific 
explanations seriously in a way that antirealists do not. For realists, 
“explanation” is a success term: the mind-independent reality determines 
whether scientists have actually succeeded in explaining and providing 
genuine understanding. To this end, realists defend a suitably  factive con-
ception of scientific explanation: genuine explanations must “latch on 
to” explanatory features of the unobservable reality. 
 The realist conception of explanations’ factivity must be immediately 
qualified. On the one hand, the assumption that (genuine) explanations 
are in some sense factive is an integral part of the realist stance toward 
scientific reasoning and its progress. On the other hand, clearly, scien-
tific explanations do not require “truth and nothing but the truth,” for 
Realism and Explanatory Perspectives 67
otherwise none of our current theories or models (which invariably 
incorporate falsehoods, approximations, and idealizations) would count 
as explanatory. The burgeoning literature on scientific explanation con-
tains various suggestions for how to understand explanations’ (qualified) 
factivity. I will begin by sketching one idea below, based on the coun-
terfactual-dependence account of explanation (section 2). Regarding the 
issue of perspectivism more specifically, I will then argue that the ensu-
ing account of explanatory understanding allows the realist to identify, 
accommodate, and motivate various perspectival aspects of science. The 
argument is based on a study of different theoretical perspectives from 
which optical phenomena have been explained and understood. Focusing 
on various explanations of the rainbow, I will show how a realist com-
mitment to steady progress in scientific understanding is compatible with 
the fact that it has involved numerous mutually incompatible metaphysi-
cal perspectives on light (sections 3 and 4). In conclusion, I will reflect 
on the “realist” content of the ensuing perspectivism about explanatory 
understanding (section 5). 
 2 Explanatory Understanding and Perspectives 
 A realist portrayal of explanatory understanding is best painted with a 
clear conception of scientific explanation in mind. It is hard to make sense 
of how explanations “latch on to” reality unless we begin with a suffi-
ciently clear account of what explanations  are and how they  work ( Saatsi 
2018b ). To this end, I will now sketch one account discussed in detail 
elsewhere. 3 The key idea of this  counterfactual-dependence account is that 
explaining is a matter of providing information about systematic patterns 
of counterfactual dependence. Explanatory counterfactuals are appropri-
ately directed and change-relating, capturing objective, mind-independent 
modal connections in the world that show how the explanandum depends 
on the explanans. The explanandum and the explanans, conceptual-
ized as variables that can take different values, stand for suitably indi-
viduated worldly features. Explanatory counterfactuals provide what if 
things had been different information, indicating how the explanandum 
would have been different had the explanans been different. Paradig-
matic explanation-supporting relations are causal, but the counterfactual-
dependence account also applies to various kinds of non-causal explana-
tions, which appeal to geometrical, mathematical, or non-causal nomologi-
cal dependencies based on, for example, symmetries. 4 
 If explaining is a matter of providing information that correctly answers 
 what-if questions, it is natural to regard as more powerful those expla-
nations that enable us to answer  more such questions (with respect to a 
given explanandum). This simple idea has rich implications regarding the 
notion of explanatory power (or “depth”), since there are many ways in 
which explanations can be compared regarding their potential to enable 
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us to answer more or less such questions. Detailed analyses of explanatory 
power along these lines have been provided by, for example,  Hitchcock 
and Woodward (2003 ) and  Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010 ). The latter 
distinguish four aspects of explanatory power: 5 
 “ Non-sensitivity ” stands for an explanatory generality, having to do 
with the range of values that the explanans variables can take with-
out breaking the explanatory relationship. 
 “ Precision ” stands for the degree of precision in which the explanan-
dum is individuated relative to some contrast class. 
 “ Degree of integration ” stands for the connectedness of an explana-
tion to other theoretical frameworks as a means of extending the 
range of  what-if questions that an agent can (more easily) answer 
with respect to particular explananda, for example, by virtue of 
equipping the agent with new inferential resources. 
 “ Cognitive salience ” stands for “the ease with which the reasoning 
behind the explanation can be followed, how easily the implications 
of the explanation can be seen and how easy it is to evaluate the 
scope of the explanation and identify possible defeaters or caveats.” 
 ( Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010 , 215) 
 Explaining is a distinctive human activity, the goal of which is the provision 
of  explanatory understanding , which we can think, along with  Ylikoski 
and Kuorikoski (2010 ), as an ability to answer correctly a range of  what-if 
questions in relation to a given explanandum. The more such answers an 
agent is able to provide (by an appropriate measure), the better under-
standing she has. In the light of this conception of understanding, there 
are both epistemic and pragmatic dimensions to explanatory achievements 
and progress of science. While the counterfactual-dependence account is 
a broadly speaking realist one (assuming an appropriate reading of the 
modalities it involves), the way in which explanations provide under-
standing requires that human beings stand in an appropriate cognitive rela-
tionship to them. It is a realist account by virtue of incorporating the  basic 
factivity requirement that explanatoriness primarily derives from explana-
tion latching on to worldly things that bear an objective, explanatorily rel-
evant dependence relation to the explanandum. But explanatory theories 
and models also typically involve non-factive aspects that have to do with 
the pragmatic, human-related dimension of understanding. This is due to 
the way in which explanatory power can in various ways be increased by 
allowing a degree of misrepresentation in an explanatory theory or model. 
 Two of these ways are particularly pertinent to us. First, information 
about explanatory dependence can often be conveyed more effectively by 
using a representation that idealizes either the target phenomenon or the 
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explanatory dependence at stake. The simplifying falsehoods that idealiza-
tions incorporate can thus contribute to an explanation’s cognitive salience, 
and/or its degree of integration, and/or its non-sensitivity ( Ylikoski and 
Kuorikoski 2010 ). Second, information about explanatory dependence can 
be most effectively grasped through a non-veridical metaphysical image 
of the system at stake. For instance, in many theoretical contexts human 
beings find it easier to cognitively operate in terms that are more familiar 
and concrete. Even if these cognitive benefits are brought about through 
partially misrepresenting the target or conceptualizing it in a wrong way—
for example, in the way that  fluid models of energy and electricity do ( de 
Regt and Gijsbers 2017 , 70–71)—they can help to provide genuine under-
standing, to the extent they enable theorists to correctly answer  what-if 
questions that are underwritten by relevant explanatory dependencies in 
the world. (For example, one can use a fluid model to efficiently grasp 
dependences between electric current, resistance, and voltage.) 
 For a quick illustration, consider a simple explanatory model of tides 
as a sine function mapped on to the relative positions of the moon and 
the sun. Although the real explanatory dependence is not exactly sinusoi-
dal, considerable mathematical convenience and cognitive salience (for 
anyone familiar with sine functions) is gained by modeling it as sinu-
soidal. Similarly, representing the gravitational effect of the sun and the 
moon in terms of Newtonian gravitational force (“pulling” the water) 
can enhance this explanation’s cognitive salience (in a typical explana-
tory context), despite misrepresenting gravity as a force (acting at a dis-
tance). Modeling tidal phenomena in these terms can provide a powerful 
explanation, tracking the dependence of tides on the explanans variables 
(namely relative positions of the moon and the sun) accurately enough, in 
a way that enables an agent (with suitable training) to answer numerous 
 what-if questions regarding the explanans. 
 This simple example illustrates the interplay between explanations’ 
factive and non-factive aspects in providing explanatory understanding. 
On the one hand, tides really do counterfactually depend on the relative 
positions of the sun and the moon; the explanation is factive and explan-
atory to the extent it captures this dependence. On the other hand, an 
idealized representation, with non-veridical metaphysical posits to boot, 
can provide better understanding than a more faithful representation by 
virtue of enabling us to better answer more  what-if questions, by mak-
ing the dependence of tides on the explanans variables cognitively more 
salient to us. In this way the “user-friendliness” of an explanatory theory 
or model can trump fidelity as an explanatory virtue, since what matters 
is the understanding that it provides limited cognitive beings like us with 
particular inferential skills and training. Recognizing the importance of 
cognitive salience also helps to appreciate how the factivity requirement 
leaves room for the possibility that maximal explanatory understanding 
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is effectively gained from several mutually incompatible theoretical con-
texts. For instance, while some  what-if questions regarding tides can 
only be correctly answered in the context of general theory of relativity 
(with curved space-time and no gravitational force), the various  what-if 
questions that arise in, for example, oceanography are best answered in 
the context of Newtonian gravity in a way that involves gravitational 
force. 6 
 I will argue below that this kind of interplay between factive and 
non-factive aspects of explanations accounts for how different “explan-
atory perspectives” naturally arise in science. To anticipate the discus-
sion of the rainbow below, consider 19th-century wave theorists of 
light, who advanced scientific understanding from the perspective of 
various ether theories. Going further back, the likes of Descartes and 
Newton presumably also advanced scientific understanding of light 
from their respective theoretical perspectives. More synchronically, in 
the contemporary context we can regard geometric ray and electromag-
netic wave models of light, along with the models of modern quantum 
optics, as offering complementary perspectives on the whys and hows 
of light phenomena. These different theories and models have steadily 
advanced the scientific understanding of light, I will argue, by virtue of 
providing accumulating information about the dependence of light phe-
nomena on various features of the world. These explanatory features 
are captured by explanans variables upon which the explanandum phe-
nomenon depends in a way that is quantitatively encapsulated in these 
theories and models. This accumulation of factive explanatory content 
is compatible with radical differences in these theories’ and models’ 
ontologies and metaphysical presuppositions, which need not be fac-
tive. These (often) non-factive presuppositions can nevertheless form 
a cognitively indispensable part of the theoretical context in which the 
explanations are situated, as we will see below in relation to various 
explanations of the rainbow. 
 As a scientific realist, I wish to maintain that advances in scientific 
understanding are achievements that relate to the way the world is beyond 
the observable phenomena. Here is an obvious challenge: how to expli-
cate the sense in which Descartes, Newton, Fresnel, and others advanced 
 genuine explanatory understanding of light given that their explanations 
presupposed mistaken explanatory posits (e.g., elastic ether). Is it not the 
case that their explanatory successes were merely  apparent , undermined 
by the subsequent ontological shifts away from their mistaken explana-
tory posits? In response, some philosophers forgo the factivity assump-
tion (and realism), construing “explanatory understanding” so as to 
allow them to maintain that past scientists achieved genuine understand-
ing despite their radically mistaken theories ( de Regt and Gijsbers 2017 ; 
 de Regt 2017 ). In the realist spirit, I am inclined to insist that genuine 
understanding requires factivity with respect to the relevant explanatory 
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dependencies; hence I will respond to the question above by explicating 
this factivity in a way that is compatible with past theorists’ understand-
ing of light being irretrievably entwined with their particular theoretical 
and metaphysical perspectives. Luckily, the counterfactual-dependence 
framework provides a way to do this by virtue of allowing factive expla-
nations to naturally incorporate also non-factive aspects that are broadly 
pragmatic and contextual. 
 From this point of view, theories and models that are false in vari-
ous ways and degrees can provide genuine explanatory understanding by 
underwriting theorists’ ability to make correct what-if-things-had-been-
different inferences. To the extent these inferences are furthermore made 
true by (causal or non-causal) dependence relations in the world, a theory 
or model latches on to reality in a way that fulfills its explanatory func-
tion regardless of its non-veridical aspects. Moreover, these explanatory 
counterfactuals can invoke explanans and explanandum variables that 
relate to unobservable features of reality, giving sufficient substance to 
realist commitment regarding explanatory understanding. 7 So while the 
non-factive, pragmatic dimension of explanations, involving idealizations 
and metaphysical presuppositions, can give rise to different explanatory 
perspectives, one’s realist commitment need only concern explanations’ 
factive dimension and the progress that science de facto makes with 
respect to it (regardless of whether or not scientists  know which aspects 
of their explanations are factive). 
 3  Reflections and Refractions on Explanatory Perspectives 
 Different explanations of the rainbow illustrate well realist commitment 
toward accumulating scientific understanding. From the dawn of sci-
ence, the rainbow has challenged scientists, primarily as an object of 
explanation (as opposed to experimentation or intervention). 8 Various 
explanations of (different aspects of) the rainbow have been provided by 
generations of physicists, including many of the most illustrious minds 
in the history of science. These explanations have been provided from 
varied theoretical and metaphysical perspectives, spanning different sci-
entific paradigms and modeling practices. Nevertheless, we will be able 
discern a steadily accumulating factive backbone of scientific under-
standing that transcends the radical shifts in the changing perspectives, 
from Descartes, through Newton and ether theorists like Fresnel, to 
the modern day. From the viewpoint of the counterfactual-dependence 
account, we can view the radical shifts in the metaphysics of light, which 
have motivated antirealist arguments from the history of science ( Lau-
dan 1981 ), as being part of the non-factive aspects of these explanations. 
This account thus enables the realist to explicate the sense in which there 
has been genuine accumulation of scientific understanding of the rain-
bow from Descartes onward. 9 
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 What does it take to “explain the rainbow”? Like any typical physical 
phenomena, there are various  aspects of the phenomenon that can be 
singled out as the explanandum, as reflected by the following questions. 
 1. Why does a rainbow have the shape it does? 
 2. Why does the (primary) rainbow form an angle of approximately 
42° from the antisolar point? 10 
 3. Why do we see a secondary rainbow at approximately 51° from the 
antisolar point? 
 4. Why is there a darker (Alexander’s) band of sky between the primary 
and the secondary rainbow? 
 5. Why does the primary rainbow have the color pattern it does (red on 
the outside rim, violet on the inside)? 
 6. Why does the secondary rainbow have the color pattern it does (red 
on the inside, violet on the outside)? 
 7. Why are there smaller “supernumerary arcs” occasionally visible 
inside the primary rainbow, with a specific spacing between them? 
 René Descartes conducted a detailed study of the rainbow, and published 
explanations of (1) through (4) in  Discours sur la méthode (1637). Accord-
ing to Descartes, these aspects of the rainbow can be explained in terms 
of the spherical shape of the raindrops in combination with a refraction of 
light (into a raindrop), internal reflection, and a further refraction (out of a 
raindrop). By using a combination of graphical analysis and numerical cal-
culations to trace the geometry of light rays, Descartes discovered that these 
assumptions about light and rain give rise to a higher concentration of light 
at the scattering angle of 138° for a single internal reflection and 129° for 
two internal reflections (corresponding to 42° and 51° angles of the primary 
and secondary bows from the antisolar point, respectively). Furthermore, the 
fact that no ray involving one internal reflection can be deflected less than 
138°, and no ray involving two reflections can be deflected more than 129°, 
can be related to the relative darkness of Alexander’s band. 
 Descartes’s explanations were provided from within his “modifica-
tionist” theory of light, according to which our perception of colors is 
due to the way in which light’s transmission rotates otherwise stationary 
ether particles, the variable spin of which causes our sensation of differ-
ent colors. Needless to say, this metaphysics is radically at odds with our 
physics. For example, since Descartes assumed light’s transmission to be 
 instantaneous , it was not possible for him to think of this transmission 
as unfolding  over time , involving refraction, a subsequent internal reflec-
tion, followed by a further refraction. Another metaphysical presupposi-
tion of Descartes’s theory was that the law of refraction was due to light 
traveling  faster in a denser medium (e.g., water) than it does in air ( Dales 
1973 ). (Many have puzzled over the consistency of this presupposition 
with Descartes’s assumption that the speed of light is not finite!) Such 
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vastly mistaken metaphysical notions and non-referential terms involved 
in Descartes’s theorizing might seem to render his explanation of the 
rainbow wholly surpassed by later theories, and unsuitable as an object 
of realist commitment of any sort. 
 This would be hasty, however. The realist can side with the standard 
historical narrative, according to which Descartes was the first to gain 
understanding of several important features of the rainbow. In essence, 
this is because the features of light relevant for Descartes’s geometrical 
analysis are entirely continuous with high-school-level geometrical ray 
optics, namely, the law of reflection and Snell’s law of refraction. We 
can further explicate Descartes’s understanding and its factivity from the 
viewpoint of the counterfactual-dependence account. Descartes managed 
to explain (1) and (2) by virtue of grasping the way in which the rainbow’s 
apparent location (relative to the location of the light source and the 
observer) depends on the shape of the raindrops and the density of water 
(responsible for the specific angle of refraction). 11 By virtue of getting 
these dependencies right, Descartes gained the ability to correctly answer 
various  what-if questions. For example, he would have been able to work 
out how things would be different if the reflecting drops were made of 
glass instead of water. 12 To the extent he gained this ability, Descartes had 
genuine understanding of the rainbow. The historical fact that he wasn’t 
able to theorize and express the relevant dependencies independently of 
his overarching mechanistic worldview and metaphysics of light rays 
does not nullify this understanding. 
 Notably, Descartes was altogether unable to account for the colors of 
the rainbow. Newton’s advance is standardly taken to consist in realiz-
ing that the index of refraction (e.g., for water) is different for different 
colors, and that white light from the sun is in some sense a “combina-
tion” of many colors. These critical ideas of the color-variability of refrac-
tion allowed Newton to answer questions (5) and (6). These ideas are, of 
course, again embedded in Newton’s broader corpuscular theory of light, 
according to which light is composed of non-spherical particles, with red 
corresponding to the larger and more massive particles than those cor-
responding to blue, for instance. Mechanical laws involving corpuscles’ 
motion through luminiferous ether would account for the law of refrac-
tion in terms of differences of velocity in different media. (In Newton’s 
“emissionist” theory denser media, such as water, “pulled” these corpus-
cles differently depending on their size and mass, resulting in a higher 
velocity component perpendicular to the interface.) Again, the broader 
perspective within which Newton’s explanation was embedded is well 
off the mark on the whole, but a realist can nevertheless maintain the 
standard story according to which Newton genuinely advanced scientific 
understanding of the rainbow. From the viewpoint of the counterfactual-
dependence account this advance can be explicated in terms of the  fur-
ther explanatory dependences that Newton got right, involving a new 
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explanatory variable corresponding to the color of light and a depen-
dence of the angle of refraction upon that variable. 13 The key to Newton’s 
explanatory advance is an approximately correct  quantitative representa-
tion of this dependence. 14 This enabled Newton to calculate the widths 
of the primary and secondary rainbow, for example, and it enabled him 
to answer new  what-if questions about rainbows. For example, unlike 
Descartes, Newton was in a position to consider how these widths would 
be different if the drops were made of more or less dispersive medium. 
Similarly, Newton and his followers explicitly worked out how tertiary 
(and higher-order) rainbows would appear, were the light intense enough 
to give rise to them ( Boyer 1959 , 247). 
 The Newtonian account still leaves some directly observable features 
of the rainbow unexplained. In particular, it says nothing about the  super-
numerary arcs that can occasionally be seen inside the primary rainbow 
(and sometimes also on the outside of the secondary bow). An explanation 
of these supernumeraries requires the introduction of new explanatory 
variables that go beyond geometrical ray optics that Newtonian corpus-
cular theory exemplified. These variables can be found in the wave theory 
of light, which encompasses optical interference phenomena responsible 
for the supernumeraries. Thomas Young first realized that the spherical 
shape of raindrops makes it possible for there to be two ray paths with 
different angles of incidence (into the drop), internally reflected at the 
same point at the drop’s rear surface, such that their final angle of refrac-
tion is the same. For light of an appropriate wavelength this gives rise to 
destructive and constructive interference, resulting in the supernumer-
ary arcs. This theoretical treatment renders the drop size (relative to the 
wavelength of light) a new explanatory variable upon which the spac-
ing of the supernumeraries depends. Furthermore, Young’s interference 
theory of the rainbow explained also a number of other puzzling qualita-
tive features that had been observed. For example, it explained why the 
bow is brighter near the earth and why the supernumerary arcs usually 
only appear near the highest part of the bow: these features depend on 
the relative size of raindrops, which tend to increase in size as they fall. 
 Again, these advances in scientific understanding were embedded within 
a particular broader perspective on the nature of light: Young (at the 
time in question) not only adhered to an optical fluid ether theory but 
also regarded light waves as longitudinal, akin to sound. This early wave 
theory was radically mistaken in many ways and unable to account for, 
for example, the polarization of light, but it nevertheless encompassed 
the right explanatory dependencies between the relevant explanatory 
variables, which are carried over to the later theoretical perspectives of 
the elastic solid ether theory, as well as the electromagnetic theory and 
beyond. 
 The subsequent idea that light waves were transverse was developed 
in a mathematically sophisticated way by Fresnel to explain various 
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polarization phenomena. This now provided understanding of features 
of the rainbow that aren’t visible by the naked eye, such as the fact (first 
noted by Biot in 1811) that the rainbow light is strongly polarized in the 
tangential direction. 15 Again, this explanatory advance was embedded 
within Fresnel’s broader elastic ether theory of light. Since such ether does 
not exist, prominent antirealists have hailed Fresnel’s theory an exem-
plar of a highly successful theory that is not even approximately true, 
undermining (certain kinds of) “convergent” realism ( Laudan 1981 ). 16 
Be the status of Fresnel’s theory as “approximately true” as it may, the 
realist can stand by the standard story that takes Fresnel’s contribution 
to explanatory understanding of the rainbow to be both genuine and 
lasting: the new explanatory variables introduced by Fresnel’s explana-
tions (e.g., light’s wavelength relative to the drop size and the direction 
of light’s polarization) capture further explanatory dependencies in the 
world. The historical fact that Fresnel (and his contemporaries) were 
unable to express and theorize about the relevant explanatory dependen-
cies independently of the metaphysics of elastic ether does not nullify this 
contribution. 
 A realist would, of course, expect the theoretical perspectives on light 
subsequent to Fresnel to also recognize and build upon the explanatory 
dependencies that his theory captures. As far as I can see, this expectation 
is fully borne out in the rich history of accumulating understanding of 
the rainbow that continues still today. For example, over the last couple 
of decades there have been advances in understanding further aspects 
of meteorological rainbows in terms of their dependence on the distri-
bution of  non-spherical (oblate) raindrops (see  Haußmann 2016 for a 
review). 17 The shape of raindrops has thus become an explanans variable 
in a deeper, more concrete way than it was before. 18 Furthermore, typi-
cal rain showers feature a broad variety of different drop sizes. It is an 
outstanding (although already partly met) challenge to work out how dif-
ferent observable features of the rainbow (e.g., colorization or the exact 
shape or brightness distribution) depend on new explanans variables that 
quantify a rain shower’s physical features, such as its drop-size distribu-
tion and the drops’ deviation from perfectly spherical shape. 
 These challenges largely belong to the domain of applied mathematics, 
a solid basis to which is provided by an exact description, in terms of 
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, of the scattering of plane wave from 
a transparent dielectric homogeneous sphere, provided by Lorentz (in 
1890) and Mie (in 1908). In the next section I will briefly discuss some 
developments in this area of applied mathematics, but I have already said 
enough to outline a realist stance toward the progressive trend that started 
with Descartes and has continued ever since. In the realist spirit we can 
view science as providing genuine understanding of natural phenomena, 
such as the rainbow, in terms of features of reality “behind the appear-
ances.” This presupposes a conception of explanation and understanding 
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that is  factive (albeit in an immediately qualified sense), supported by the 
counterfactual-dependence account of explanation. This account allows 
us to explicate the accumulating understanding in terms of scientists’ 
increasing ability to answer counterfactual  what-if questions regarding 
various explanatory variables. Our theories and models capture better 
and better how different explanandum variables depend on different 
explanans variables. These variables capture the dependence of differ-
ent aspects of the rainbow on physical features of the world that are not 
observable, such as the raindrops’ shape and their size relative to light’s 
wavelength, and the direction of light’s propagation and polarization. 
The accumulation of this factive content is fully compatible with the fact 
that different explanatory theories and models also have non-factive ele-
ments that give rise to mutually incompatible perspectives on light, due 
to, for example, the different ontological and metaphysical presupposi-
tions that were an inextricable part of Descartes’s, Newton’s, and Fres-
nel’s theorizing about light. 
 4 Which Explanation Is the “Best”? 
 So far, I have looked at the accumulation of understanding over the his-
tory of changing “paradigms” in optics. Let’s now consider the (minimal) 
realist outlook in relation to mutually incompatible models employed in 
the current state of the art. The classic Lorentz-Mie theory of scattering 
can be regarded as the “complete and fundamental” theory of rainbow 
scattering. It is taken to deductively entail all the optical properties of 
an “ideal” rainbow. 19 Since this model of Maxwell’s theory contains all 
the answers to different  what-if questions about the (ideal) rainbow, one 
might think that we have reached the explanatory bedrock (regarding 
“ideal” rainbows)—the ultimate explanatory framework. Yet understand-
ing of the rainbow has progressed much further since the inception of the 
Lorentz-Mie theory. Since scientists regard the subsequent development 
of, for example, idealized “semi-classical” explanatory models to provide 
deeper understanding, a realist must acknowledge the indispensability of 
further explanatory perspectives beyond the “complete and fundamen-
tal” theory. Hence, in some sense the fundamental theory only provides 
a limited explanatory perspective, which needs to be complemented by 
other vantage points to yield more comprehensive understanding. How 
should a realist interpret this plurality of explanatory models? 
 Different explanatory perspectives at stake here can again be under-
stood from the viewpoint of the counterfactual-dependence account. In 
order to explicate the explanatory value of the idealized “semi-classical” 
models, I first need to say a few words about these further advances on 
the Lorentz-Mie theory. 20 These advances primarily turn on approxi-
mation schemes, such as the Complex-Angular-Momentum (CAM) 
method, which aim to extract the key features of the dynamics of the 
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electromagnetic wave in a way that makes them transparent to us. As 
Nussenzveig puts it: 
 A vast amount of information on the diffraction effects that we want 
to study lies buried within the Mie solution. In order to understand 
and to obtain physical insight into these effects . . . it is necessary to 
extract this information in a “sufficiently simple form.” 
 ( Nussenzveig 1992 , 45) 
 This simplicity, which is “to some extent . . . in the eye of the beholder” 
( Nussenzveig 1992 , 210), can be achieved by suitable “semi-classical” 
approximations, occupying the rich theoretical borderland between 
geometrical ray theory and the wave theory. By working with idealized 
ray-theoretic concepts, while simultaneously making sufficient room for 
interference and diffraction effects, these approximations yield theoreti-
cal representations that render the relevant explanatory dependencies 
cognitively more transparent. 
 Although the Lorentz-Mie theory provides an exact solution of plane 
wave scattering by ideal spherical drops, it has the pragmatic downside 
of leading to a mathematical series that converges very slowly for par-
ticles of the size of raindrops. Thus, this theory is  oracular : a power-
ful enough computer can crunch through a sufficient number of terms 
(typically several thousands) to yield however precise values of scatter-
ing amplitudes one desires, against which approximate solutions can be 
compared. However, due to the high number of terms and the series’ lack 
of further physically interpretable structure, it provides no insight into 
aspects of the scattering process upon which the spacing of supernumer-
ary bows depends. (A Laplacean demon might disagree, of course!) The 
first step beyond the Lorentz-Mie theory is to shift to the Debye series, 
which mathematically decomposes the wave front into “partial” waves, 
some of which are externally reflected, some transmitted directly through 
the drop, and some transmitted after  n internal reflections. This series, 
which also provides an exact solution (equivalent to the Mie series), cap-
tures at the level of the wave theory the idea that the overall scattering 
dynamics can be represented as a sum of different processes, involving, 
for example, light that undergoes one internal reflection before transmis-
sion (responsible for the primary bow), light that undergoes two internal 
reflections (responsible for the secondary bow), and so on, with some 
of the light being “trapped” inside the drop for a number of revolutions 
before transmitting. However, the Debye series by itself does not allow 
us to identify which aspects of the scattering dynamics thus represented 
critically contribute to the features of the supernumerary bow. 
 Enter the CAM method. This approach allows the slowly converging 
partial wave series to be transformed into an approximate, rapidly converg-
ing expression in terms of “poles” and “saddle-points” in a complex-valued 
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angular momentum space, representing the main contributions to the scat-
tering amplitude at the primary rainbow angle. An interpretation of these 
poles and saddle-points in terms of both wave theoretic concepts (e.g., 
“tunneling” and “evanescent waves” near the drop’s surface),  as well as 
ray-theoretic concepts, provides the best means to bring out those aspects 
of the overall scattering process upon which the explanandum depends. By 
doing so it improves our explanatory understanding of the supernumerar-
ies. Thus our best understanding of the rainbow involves representing light 
both as a wave and as a ray. How should a realist understand this plural-
ity of incompatible perspectives? On the face of it, the explanatory indis-
pensability of ray concepts could be taken to suggest that the ray-theoretic 
perspective is revealing features of light scattering that the wave theoretic 
perspective somehow misses. 
 I think the counterfactual-dependence account nicely captures the 
explanatory power of the semi-classical CAM perspective, even if we 
take Maxwell’s theory to provide the “fundamental” story. 21 This is due 
to the  importance of explanations’ cognitive salience (cf. section 3). To 
illustrate this, consider a specific explanandum: why is the spacing  S of 
the supernumeraries of a given rainbow 1.65°? From the counterfactual-
dependence viewpoint, an agent understands the spacing if she is in a 
position to answer  what-if questions of the sort “how would  S be different 
if . . .” with respect to explanans variables, that is, wavelength and drop 
size, over some range of possibilities. Using the Lorentz-Mie theory the 
agent is capable of answering these questions, but only if assisted by a suf-
ficiently powerful computer. The way in which the explanandum depends 
on the explanans is cognitively opaque to her. 22 The CAM approach pro-
vides deeper understanding by virtue of enhancing the agent’s ability to 
answer such questions by revealing a much simpler explanatory depen-
dence of the scattering amplitude on the explanans variables, without 
compromising the level of accuracy required for answering the explanan-
dum at stake. This simplicity is not just an increase in computational 
efficiency but also a matter of representationally breaking down, in an 
idealized way, the overall Mie scattering into distinct processes, only some 
of which effectively contribute to the rainbow by largely determining  S 
as a function of the explanans variables. This explanatory dependence 
is cognitively more transparent to us, and hence a theory that captures it 
provides (in a sense) a better explanation. In this way the counterfactual-
dependence framework explicates the progress in the understanding of the 
rainbow achieved by moving from the  exact Lorentz-Mie theory to the 
CAM  approximation , the less fundamental explanatory notions of which 
(such as light rays and evanescent “surface” waves) can thus feature in 
our “best” explanation of the rainbow. This improvement is not a matter 
of introducing new explanatory variables that ontologically transcend the 
Lorentz-Mie theory ( Pincock 2011 ), nor is it a matter of providing more 
fine-grained information about the explanatory dependence. Rather, the 
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improvement has to do with the way in which the CAM approach identi-
fies critical explanans variables upon which the explanandum depends  in 
a simple way . These variables and the explanatory dependencies are fully 
grounded in the wavelike nature of light and its dynamics; they are not 
indicative of properties that somehow transcend Maxwell’s theory. 
 What counts as the “best” explanation partly depends on the context 
that determines how the different dimensions of explanatory depth are 
weighed. The CAM approach can be taken to provide the most power-
ful explanation in the context of “pen and paper” mathematical physics, 
while in the context of a computer-assisted study of actual (non-ideal) 
meteorological rainbows, with variable-sized hamburger-bun-shaped 
drops, the generalized Lorentz-Mie theory backs the most powerful 
explanatory understanding. 23 There is no objective answer as to which 
explanation is the “best” independently of such contextual factors. By the 
same token, even though the earlier explanatory accounts from Descartes 
onward are all strictly speaking false (even if we ignore their supereroga-
tory metaphysical content), these accounts can still be valuable sources 
of understanding, and they can indeed be viewed as providing the “best” 
explanation of certain aspects of the rainbow in suitable explanatory 
contexts. For example, in the context of high school physics the gist of 
Descartes’s account (sans Cartesian metaphysics) provides the best expla-
nation, simply because it provides the cognitively most transparent way 
to capture the dependence of the approximate angles of primary and sec-
ondary bows upon the spherical geometry of raindrops given the laws of 
reflection and refraction. Overall, the indispensable plurality of (strictly 
speaking) incompatible explanatory perspectives can thus be accommo-
dated in terms of the pragmatic dimension of understanding, in a way that 
is compatible with the basic factivity requirement of (minimal) realism. 
 5 Implications for Scientific Realism 
 The case of the rainbow typifies the way in which scientific understanding 
is situated in and colored by radically different ways of thinking about 
what there is in the world and what laws of nature describe. Our current 
science provides one set of perspectives, and we should be open to yet 
different, further theoretical perspectives that may be conceived in the 
fullness of time. In so far as scientific realism involves a commitment to 
genuine scientific understanding and progress thereof, it must embrace 
and make sense of such explanatory perspectives. 
 Notwithstanding the plurality of explanatory perspectives, there is a 
standard story of the accumulating understanding of the rainbow due 
to Descartes, Newton, Young, Fresnel, and many others. I have argued 
that a well-motivated philosophical account of explanatory understand-
ing vindicates and further explicates this story. The realist dimension 
of this account is due to the assumption that genuine explanations are 
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underwritten by explanatory dependencies in the world. This is the basic 
factivity requirement of the counterfactual-dependence account. Explan-
atory understanding, in turn, can be construed as an agent’s ability to 
make correct counterfactual  what-if inferences. Thus construed, under-
standing has several distinctly pragmatic aspects, which can be associ-
ated with the non-factive elements of explanatory theories and models, 
such as idealizations and mistaken metaphysical presuppositions, that are 
involved in different explanatory perspectives. From the viewpoint of this 
account, a realist can make sense of the steady accumulation of genuine 
understanding of various optical phenomena, including the paradigmatic 
rainbow, regardless of the fact that all explanations are situated in one or 
another theoretical perspective. 
 Clearly, this realist account is rather minimal in its commitments to 
what the unobservable world is like. In particular, it does not incorporate 
the (“standard” realist) notion that our current best theories are “approx-
imately true,” or that they approach some kind of “ultimate” (God’s-eye) 
perspective. And it neither supports nor presupposes inference to (the 
approximate truth of) the best explanation. (Indeed, as we have seen, 
what counts as “best” partly depends on the context in which explana-
tions are given and assessed.) At the same time, the kind of understanding 
that we can attribute to scientists satisfies (suitably minimal) realist ambi-
tions given the factivity assumption, and it certainly goes beyond antireal-
ism according to which theories of light are merely effective instruments 
for making predictions of observable phenomena and guiding practical 
applications and interventions. 24 The factivity assumption requires that 
genuine understanding is underwritten by objective worldly facts about 
how the explanandum really depends on the explanans. Understand-
ing accumulates when our explanatory theories and models give us the 
ability to make more  what-if inferences, the correctness of which cor-
responds to worldly dependence facts. This accumulation can be partly 
a matter of new explanations containing explanatory information in a 
cognitively more salient form, given our cognitive makeup, inferential 
abilities, and training. And, more importantly for the realist, the accumu-
lation of understanding is often a matter of introducing new explanatory 
variables that represent further explanatory dependencies, typically in the 
form of functional equations linking the explanans and the explanan-
dum. These variables capture physical features of the world that need not 
be observable. In a given theoretical perspective, these variables can be 
given a rich metaphysical interpretation, which the realist should not be 
committed to. Or, these variables can be presented in an idealized way, 
which the realist should not be committed to either. Rather, she should 
only be committed to the most minimal interpretation of the explanatory 
variables that allows her to speak of the explanatory dependencies. 
 In the case of the rainbow, this commits the realist to explanatory 
variables that capture properties of light and rain, such as the shape of 
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the raindrops, their size relative to light’s wavelength, and the direction 
of light’s propagation and polarization. The fact that there are various 
perspectives in which such explanatory variables have been embedded is 
an essential part of the way  human beings understand the world, involv-
ing also non-factive aspects of our explanatory theories and models. 
Exactly which aspects are non-factive? We do not know. Some aspects of 
explanations are justifiably regarded as non-factive idealizations, given 
their discord with our theoretical beliefs and (typically) the prospects 
of de-idealization. But on the whole we are not reliably able to sharply 
demarcate between our current explanations’ factive and non-factive 
aspects, especially when it comes to the interpretation of the variables 
that feature in functional relationships that support explanations in the 
counterfactual-dependence mode. This is a lesson we have to learn from 
the history of science, as some of the more minimally inclined (for exam-
ple, structural) realists have acknowledged ( Saatsi 201 9). At the same 
time, nothing in the history of science speaks against the broader realist 
notion that steady and genuine explanatory progress is being made with 
understanding-providing theories and models that de facto latch on to 
reality better and better (in the sense of the basic factivity requirement). 
This progress in scientific understanding of the world does not amount 
to accumulating knowledge, however, since understanding is not fac-
tive in the way knowledge is, and non-factive aspects of theoretical rep-
resentations can increase our understanding without us knowing their 
non-factive status. Thus while I agree with the self-proclaimed “perspec-
tival realists” that a notion of “perspective” helps in articulating scientific 
realism, I do not think we should necessarily associate this notion with 
knowledge the way they do. 
 Acknowledgments 
 I would like to thank Callum Duguid, Steven French, Kareem Khalifa, 
Rob Knowles, Michela Massimi, and Alice Murphy for very helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft. Support from The British Academy as part of 
the Mid-Career Fellowship  Scientific Realism Reinvigorated is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 Notes 
 1. See, e.g.,  Giere (2006 ),  Massimi (2018a ), and  Teller (2018 ).  Massimi (2018b ) 
offers a review. 
 2 . This account of progressive scientific understanding dovetails with my view 
that theoretical progress in science in general does not reduce to accumula-
tion of knowledge. See  Saatsi (201 9). 
 3 . See, e.g.,  Hitchcock and Woodward (2003 ),  Woodward (2003b ),  Woodward 
and Hitchcock (2003 ),  Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010 ), and  Jansson and 
Saatsi (2017 ). 
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 4 . See, e.g.,  Saatsi and Pexton (2013 ),  Reutlinger (2016 ),  Saatsi (2018a ),  Jansson 
and Saatsi (2017 ), and  French and Saatsi (2018 ). 
 5.  Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010 ) also present “factual accuracy” as an aspect 
of explanatory power. In my presentation this is built into the characteriza-
tion of explaining being a matter of  correctly answering  what-if questions . 
 6 . See  Bokulich (2016 ) for related, more general discussion of the usability of 
the Newtonian gravitational theory in oceanographical explanations, in the 
context of which “the classical Newtonian force picture does [the best] job 
of making transparent the relevant patterns of counterfactual dependence” 
( Bokulich 2016 , 273). 
 7 . Woodward (2003a ) has called a position along these lines “instrumental 
realism.” 
 8 . Experiments with prisms and such have of course been central to the scien-
tific study of the rainbow from the Middle Ages onwards. 
 9 . Such accumulation is recognized in the standard history of this area of sci-
ence, as told by both historians of science and scientists themselves. See, for 
example,  Boyer (1959 );  Haußmann (2016 ). 
 10 . The antisolar point is the point on the celestial sphere that is directly oppo-
site the sun from an observer’s perspective. 
 11 . Clearly Descartes was not in a position to answer correctly any appreciable 
range of  what-if questions regarding these variables; for example, what if 
raindrops were oblate thus and so, as opposed to being spherical? Thus, his 
explanation should be considered quite shallow. But for a realist it marks a 
genuine explanatory advance nevertheless. 
 12 . This is indeed something that Christiaan Huygens explicitly calculated in 
1652. The answer is that the bow angle would be approximately 25° instead 
of 41° ( Boyer 1959 ). 
 13 . In due course this variable comes to be associated with light’s wavelength. 
 14 . As Newton put it: “the Science of Colors becomes a speculation as truly 
mathematical as any other part of  Opticks ” ( Boyer 1959 , 241). 
 15 . For the primary rainbow, the single internal reflection angle near the caustic 
is very close to Brewster’s angle, at which no p-polarized light (corresponding 
to the radial direction as seen from the observer) is reflected. 
 16 . See  Saatsi (2015 ) for further discussion of Laudan’s reasoning and its limita-
tions as an argument against realism. 
 17 . A natural raindrop typically resembles an asymmetrically squashed sphere 
due to air resistance (the bottom part being flatter than the dome-like top, 
like a hamburger bun), so the optical scattering properties for real-life rain 
showers differ from those of a collection of perfect spheres. 
 18 . See note 10. 
 19 . The generalized Lorentz-Mie theory goes beyond plane waves and spherical 
drops ( Gouesbet and Gréhan 2011 ). 
 20 . The details that I must brush over here are well summarized in  Pincock (2011 ) 
and reviewed in more detail in, for example,  Adam (2002 ) and  Nussenzveig 
(1992 ). I broadly agree with Pincock’s assessment of the explanatory virtues 
of these models, which he however expresses independently of any particular 
way of understanding explanation or explanatory understanding. A further 
important part of the scientific understanding of the rainbow, which I do 
not even touch here, concerns the universality of rainbow phenomena over 
variation in, for example, drop shapes. See  Batterman (2001 ,  2005 ) and  Belot 
(2005 ). 
 21 . Of course, Maxwell’s theory does not provide a truly fundamental theory of 
light, since it is not a quantum theory. 
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 22 . In this tune, an epigraph in Nussenzveig’s classic exposition of the CAM 
approach reads: “it is nice to know that the computer understands the prob-
lem, but I would like to understand it too” ( Nussenzveig 1992 , 37). 
 23 . The Debye approximation, upon which the CAM approach builds, is not 
valid for non-spherical drops. 
 24 . Here I differ from  de Regt (2017 ), whose account of understanding also 
emphasizes the contextual nature of understanding, but articulates it in a 
way that is empty of any realist commitment. See also  de Regt and Gijs-
bers (2017 ). Unfortunately, I don’t have space to engage here with de Regt’s 
account, which I regard as insufficient for making sense of the intertheoretic 
relations between different theories and models of light. See also  Khalifa 
(2017 ) and  Woodward (2003a ). 
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